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ORIGINALIST THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Raoul Berger t
I feel somewhat like Rip Van Winkle, who, opening his eyes on
a brave new world, is not all sure he understands what is going on
around him. I was greatly comforted by Charles Fried's observation
that he deplored the eruption of philosophy into the law. When I
emerged from the cave, one of the things that struck me, was cur-
rent discourse about levels of abstraction. Jacques Barzun remarked
that abstraction is a ladder that leads into the clouds, so that if one
climbs high enough, then the croaking of a frog and the song of a
great soprano are the same because both generate airwaves.
Let me start with an observation that was made thirty-five years
ago by Willard Hurst. He said, "when you are talking about consti-
tutional law, you are talking about the balance of power in the com-
munity and ... the question of how you find meaning boils down
concretely here to who finds the meaning."' This morning, Judge
Posner emphasized that the Constitution is a text. Let me add that
it is a text of very special and peculiar significance. It is a text that
was designed to limit and hobble the exercise of power by the dele-
gates of the people. That is the starting point from which we have
to proceed and to evaluate what the delegates were seeking. Long
before Acton, a remarkable North Carolinian, Thomas Burke, em-
phasized that it was necessary to guard against the greediness of
power. On top of that, the founders had a profound distrust ofjudi-
cial discretion. Even a Tory judge, Thomas Hutchison of Massachu-
setts, said, ..... the Judge should never be the Legislator... this tends
to a State of Slavery." 2 It was for this reason that Chancellor Kent
referred to judges' "dangerous discretion ... and to roam at large
in the trackless field of their own imaginations."-3
I am a little surprised to hear about varieties of originalism.
The only variety I know is the good, old-fashioned kind. Let me
define it. I understand by original intention, the explanation that
t Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Retired, Harvard Uni-
versity. J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard.
I SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 74 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (remarks of Professor
Hurst).
2 Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, 5
PERSP. AM. HIST. 287, 292 (1971).
3 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858).
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draftsmen gave of what their words were designed to accomplish,
what their words mean. Why, activists ask us, should we allow the
founders to rule us from their graves? On such reasoning the text is
also not binding. Whence, then, comes the authority of the judges?
From the founders that conferred that authority, and it is confined
by their written restrictions.
Resort to original intention is required if only because some
words in the Constitution are susceptible of an enormous range of
meaning. One has only to think of equal protection, for example. It
means so much that one commentator says it means nothing. Un-
less limited by the original intention, those words serve as a crystal
ball from which a judge, like a soothsayer, can draw forth anything
he wants. That flies in the face of the founders' distrust of judicial
discretion. Then too, one who studies the historical records finds
that the states very grudgingly, very jealously, delegated only so
much of their powers as they considered necessary for "national"
purposes. It is utterly inconceivable that these jealous states would
endow the judges with a power that would place them utterly at the
judicial mercy, as in fact, has proven the case under the Court's
readings of the Commerce Clause.4 That is not what the founders
had in mind at all.
Remember, too, that Hamilton reassured the electorate that the
judges were next to nothing-an idea that is incompatible with a
delegation to them of the power to re-write the Constitution. That
is what we are really talking about-let's get rid of the euphe-
misms-may judges revise the Constitution, in order, as Justice
Black scornfully said, to bring it "in tune with the times"? 5 Let me
allude, also, to the basic presupposition-that appears as early as
Francis Bacon, and is reiterated by our own James Wilson, and by
Chief Justice Marshall-that the function of a judge is to construe,
to interpret the law, not to make it. That distinction was drawn time
and again in later opinions by the Supreme Court.
We also need to remember that there was a very strenuous
struggle over the adoption of the Constitution. In many states it
was touch and go. In some, such as North Carolina, adoption was
utterly defeated. In order to allay hostility to the document, to reas-
sure the ratifiers, the federalists sought to explain to them the mean-
ing of the text. Thus, Hamilton downgraded the powers of the
Presidency to an extraordinary degree. Those assurances were
designed to garner votes; they were representations. Justice Story
later wrote about similar representations that to repudiate them
4 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
5 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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would "be a fraud upon the whole people." 6 Activists scorn the
original intention, not because they have access to a deeper well of
interpretation, but because that intention undermines the modern
decisions that have effectuated their aspirations. 7 I share those aspi-
rations, but I won't warp the Constitution in order to effectuate
them. Until activists sought to bolster the Warren Court's deci-
sions, Judge Robert Bork observed, "there was never any doubt that
the document was to be construed so as to give effect, as nearly as
possible, to the intentions of those who made it."8
What is at stake is revealed by Benno Schmidt, President of
Yale University, who recently said, referring to the desegregation
decision, that the fourteenth amendment's general language al-
lowed it to be used to spur a revolution in race relations, despite the
clear probability that its authors did not intend it as such. In other
words, the Court read general words in disregard of the specific in-
tention in order to work a revolution in race relations. One may
agree that a revolution was needed, and yet question whether the
Court was meant to be the instrument of revolution. That is the
issue that is involved in this colorless phrase "original intention."
On the basis of a recent study that I published, I am convinced
that the Anglo-American doctrine of original intention reaches back
600 years or more.9 For centuries, courts have turned to the origi-
nal intention. An English historian, S.R. Grimes, concluded that
"the rule of reference to the intention of the legislators ...was
certainly established by the second half of the fifteenth century."' 0
My own studies place it even earlier. In 1615, Chief Justice Coke
said that in construing Acts of Parliament, "the original intent and
meaning is to be observed."" Express words, he stated, were to
govern "when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the
contrary."' 2 That is a rule which the medievalists adopted before
him, as exemplified by the famous bloodletting in the streets of
Bologna. It became the rule, for example, in statutory construction.
6 2J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1084,
at 33 (5th ed. 1905).
7 "Those who favor abortion, busing.., and who oppose capital punishment...
obviously have no faith whatever in the wisdom of the will of the great majority of the
people, who are opposed to them. They are doing everything possible to have these
problems resolved by a small minority in the courts and the bureaucracy." Bishop, What
is a Liberal-Who is a Conservative?, 62 COMMENTARY 31, 47 (1976).
8 Bork, Foreword to G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY at v (1985).
9 Berger, Original Intention in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986).
10 S. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 293
(1966).
11 Magdalen College Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235, 1245 (K.B. 1615).
12 Edrich's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 238, 239 (C.P. 1603).
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If the intention appears, it overrides the words. Our own Justice
James Wilson, second only to Madison as an architect of the Consti-
tution, stated, "The first and governing maxim in the interpretation
of a statute is, to discover the meaning of those, who made it."13
Little wonder, then, that Chief Justice Marshall observed that he
could cite from the common law "the most complete evidence that
the intention is the most sacred rule of interpretation." 14
A constitution is a written document, and as John Selden, the
seventeenth century sage, observed, "a man's wryting has but one
true sense, which is that which the Author meant when he writ it."15
This is the essence of communication. It is for the writer to explain
what his words mean; the reader may dispute the proposition, but
he may not insist in the face of the writer's own explanation that the
writer meant something different. When a doctrine is 200 years old,
said Justice Holmes, it should take a mighty strong case to overturn
it.
Activists argue that words change their meaning. To be sure,
they do, and were we to write a new constitution, we could use
words according to our present meaning. But we have no right to
saddle our meaning on the dearly different meaning that the foun-
ders assigned to their words. That is just a device for escaping their
explanation of what they meant to accomplish. To this day, we seek
to ascertain the intention of Congress in construing statutes; every
student of statutory construction knows that. And I would ask, why
should judges feel bound by the legislators' intention and yet feel
free to ignore the will of the framers, a will that was ratified by the
people?
Limited government, Jefferson declared, is designed to bind
our delegates "down from mischief by the chains of the Constitu-
tion." 16 In carrying out their purpose to curb excessive exercise of
power, the founders used words to forge those chains. We dissolve
the chains when we change the meaning of the words. Certainly the
Supreme Court from earliest times was a devotee of the original in-
tention.1 7 I call your attention to a rarely noted early case, Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts.18 "The solution of this question [of construc-
13 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 75 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
14 JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 167 (Gunther ed. 1969)
(emphasis in original).
15 J. SELDEN, TABLE TALK 13 (Quartich ed. 1927).
16 C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 153 (1925).
17 The Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and
object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons
who formulated the instrument or of the people who adopted it." tenBroek, Use by the
United States Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitu-
tional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1939).
18 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
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tion] must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution; the
meaning and intention of the convention which framed and pro-
posed it for adoption and ratification to the [ratification] conven-
tions.., to which this Court has always resorted in construing the
constitution."' 9 We are not dealing with some idle originalist fanta-
sies, but with a doctrine that even the activist Thomas Grey said has
deep roots in history, deep roots in constitutional law.
Did the founders mean that their intentions should prevail?
Madison wrote that "if [the sense in which the Constitution was ac-
cepted and ratified by the nation] be not the guide in expounding it,
there can be no security... for a faithful exercise of its powers." 20
Jefferson pledged himself to exercise the presidential powers in ac-
cord with the intention of those who framed and ratified the Consti-
tution. That the framers intended posterity to resort to their
intention is evidenced by the preservation of the Convention jour-
nal. James Wilson's reason for doing so, as Madison explained, was
that, "As false suggestions may be propagated it should not be
made impossible to contradict them." 2' 1 In other words, we should
keep this journal because in the future others may have a false view
of what we meant, and this journal will confute them. In the state
ratification conventions, for example, there were quite a few framers
who attended, and were asked repeatedly to explain what they had
meant. And the framer who was a delegate from Virginia, or from
Massachusetts, explained to those who were not at the Convention,
"Oh no, we had no such purpose in mind, we meant thus and so."
How in good conscience can we disregard such representations?
I close with a seldom noted remark ofJustice Harlan, who to my
mind was the outstanding judge of this generation, "When the
Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Fram-
ers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the
amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitu-
tional structure which it is its highest duty to protect." 22
19 Id. at 721.
20 9 WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
21 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 648 (1911).
22 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (HarlanJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Robert Bennettt
Our subject is "Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpre-
tation," but I want to argue, in a sense, that this is not a real subject;
that what is commonly called originalism is not a real or at least not
a very coherent option for constitutional interpretation. I know of
much dispute about originalism, but most of the proponents of what
goes under that name seem to me not to have taken very seriously
the theory either of interpretation or of originalism.
The sub-heading for our topic is "textualist and intentionalist
options." I want to make clear that the kind of originalism whose
viability I dispute is called "intentionalism," i.e., the notion that
contemporary constitutional questions are to be answered by refer-
ence to the intentions of those responsible for putting the provision
in question on the books. What is called "textualism," by contrast,
seems to me unproblematic. To be a textualist, as I understand it, is
simply to feel that those interpreting the Constitution are bound by
its words. It is common to assume that interpreting words is an easy
process, and, in particular, to confuse fidelity to language with a nar-
row literalism. Literalism in interpretation raises familiar problems,
and I am certainly not a literalist. But if textualism is merely an ac-
knowledgement of the authority of the Constitution's language, I
am a dyed-in-the-wool textualist. Intentionalism, or (as I will call it
from here on out) originalism, is quite another thing.
I will first simply mention, without discussing, three well under-
stood and serious problems with originalism. The first is the obvi-
ous historical problem. The second is what I call the summing
problem: how to define the appropriate group of intenders and
then combine their individual subjective states of mind to come up
with a constitutional intention. The third is the problem of the easy
manipulability of levels of generality and specificity in defining the
relevant intention.
I would like to concentrate, instead, on what seems to me a
more fundamental problem with the originalist enterprise, one that
has received relatively little attention in the discussions of the sub-
ject. The problem is basically this. Assuming that we have sur-
t Dean, Northwestern Law School. B.A. 1962; LL.B. 1965, Harvard University.
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mounted the summing problem, so that we can talk of a single
intender, consider the hypothetical question of how the original in-
tender would resolve a contemporary constitutional problem had he
promulgated the language originally, and had he decided all the
cases that had arisen pursuant to it in the meantime, and indeed,
had he lived through everything that had happened in the
meantime. Is the originalist answer to the contemporary constitu-
tional question necessarily the same as the answer to this hypotheti-
cal question, or might it be different? Let us consider those two
possibilities in turn.
First, if the originalist answer is necessarily the same as the an-
swer to this hypothetical question, if that is what originalism means,
then originalism is meaningful. But it brings with it none of the an-
swers to contemporary questions that those who style themselves
originalists so confidently assert it does. It does not tell us that Roe
v. Wade1 is wrong or right, nor that the legislative apportionment
cases are wrong or right. Originalism, in this sense, tells us precious
little about how contemporary constitutional questions are to be an-
swered, because the determinants of an individual's decision over
time are many and complex. Individuals often change their minds as
they live and learn and grow, or fail to grow.
Consider a single individual first harboring some original inten-
tion as he promulgates a constitutional provision, and then succes-
sively confronting two different cases that arise under that pro-
vision, two cases that are different from each other and different
from anything he had thouight about when he promulgated the pro-
vision. I would assert that the answer to the problem that arises in
the second case would very much be influenced by the process of
reasoning that went into the first case. We have much to learn about
reasoning by analogy, but it is clear that much legal reasoning re-
quires judgment that one situation is like an earlier one, that in real
cases those judgments of similarity are seldom unproblematic, and
that once one judgment of similarity has been made, there are then
two potential bases for further judgments of similarity-the subject
of the original intention on the one hand, and of the first decision
on the other. I would further assert that the relationship of analogy
is not, in any obvious sense, a transitive one. That is, if B is analo-
gous to A, C can be analogous to B, even though C is not analogous
to A.
If this is so, then the judge (or my hypothetical original in-
tender) deciding all cases over time is inevitably off on a decisional
journey, informed by analogies that after a while may suggest con-
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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clusions bearing only a faint historical relationship to what was orig-
inally intended. The journey through analogies or other real-world
influences on an individual's decisions can quite possibly even lead
to a repudiation of something that the intender would recognize as
originally intended.
My favorite example of a step in such a journey of analogies is
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 the early fourteenth amendment case that raised
the question (among others) of whether Chinese aliens were entitled
to the protection of that amendment. The Court held in favor of
their claim. I do not know of a single contemporary constitutional
scholar, be he self-styled originalist or some other breed, who
claims that Yick Wo was wrongly decided, at least in that respect. Yet
the question in Yick Wo is not identical to any subject of original
intention. Yick Wo becomes an easy case, if it is one, only by means
of a non-obvious, analogical step-and once that step is taken, Yick
Wo becomes available to inform further steps in thejourney that the
deciding agency must travel.
Let us now turn to the second possibility: that originalism
means something other than answering questions by reference to
my hypothetical intender deciding all cases over time. If this is the
case, then one must acknowledge that the contemporary decision is
governed by something other than the mental state of the intender
as it would interact with events and information over time. About
any such assertion, I have two questions. First, how do we choose
what part of the mental state of the intender that would have actu-
ally influenced his decisions to ignore? There is very little discus-
sion of this question in the literature. One scholar who has
addressed this question is my colleague in that other part of the
Northwest Territories, Michael Perry, with whom I have talked
about this subject many times. Professor Perry says that the
originalist's obligation is to follow that part of the intender's mental
state that he authoritatively established. But I do not know how to
identify that part. The intender has a perfectly good way of authori-
tatively establishing constitutional language, but none that I know of
for authoritatively establishing a part of his mental state.
My second question is this. Supposing that we could segregate
part of the intender's mental state from the rest, and answer consti-
tutional questions by reference to only that part, what would be the
appeal of doing so? I understand the appeal of construing language
by reference to the state of mind of the author of the language: the
approach has several virtues that I will not belabor here. (In con-
tracts, however, Professor Berger to the contrary notwithstanding,
2 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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we do not always take that route; we often prefer the understanding
of the addressee of the language.) But when we choose only a part
of what actually would have informed the author's decision had it
been his to make, we would be more candid to acknowledge that the
decision is really ours and not try to clothe it with the authority of
the language the intender promulgated by pretending that it is re-
ally a decision referable to his intention.
Let me close with a plea for candor. If one takes what I have
said seriously, then it is apparent that originalism does not provide a
basis for resolving constitutional questions that can be abstracted
from the actual process of confronting and deciding those ques-
tions. In particular, the role of precedent will likely loom large in
any decision making process that is used to elaborate the meaning
of language promulgated at one time and then applied to a series of
problems over an extended period. Precedent would certainly play
such a role for the intender, were he the decision maker.
What really animates much of the originalist enterprise is not a
reasoned conclusion that there is a theory there, but rather a dissat-
isfaction with what is perceived to be mischievous judicial activism.
Nothing that I have said is meant to reflect a choice between judicial
activism and judicial restraint. That is a debate that has and should
be carried on in its own terms and that will proceed to a happier
ending, I firmly believe, when we no longer cloud the issue by refer-
ence to an unattainable regime of decision according to original
intention.
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